

## Otto Braun's Curriculum Vitae— Translation and Commentary

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In 1934 the center of the Chinese Communist revolution, the Jiangxi Soviet, faced annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek's troops. Only by what was at first called a "strategic transfer" and later became known as the "Long March" were the Communists initially able to survive. When in early 1935 the Communist leadership felt the need to look back and "explain" the debacle (resulting in the so-called Zunyi Resolution<sup>1</sup>), they chose to put most of the blame not on the overwhelming military superiority of the Nationalists, nor on possible errors and deficiencies in their own performance, but on the German communist military advisor Otto Braun (aliases Li De and Hua Fu), who was said to have practically taken over the military leadership of the Red Army during 1934.<sup>2</sup>

Since then, Chinese communists have usually blamed Braun and, above all, his tactic of *duancu tuji* ("short, swift strikes"—discussed below) for the military defeat of the Jiangxi Soviet, averring that, had Mao's strategy and tactics been used as before, neither the end of the Soviet nor the Long March would have happened then.<sup>3</sup>

More interesting than the hackneyed denunciations of Braun are the exceptions: In talks with Edgar Snow, Zhou Enlai, for example, did not blame Braun's tactics for the loss of the Jiangxi Soviet, but rather the Nationalists' superiority and the CCP's non-cooperation with the Fujian rebels (which he does partly blame on Braun).<sup>4</sup> During the Cultural Revolution Braun seems to have become a lesser target, with Wang Ming suddenly being said to have behaved like a *taishanghuang* ("God of War")<sup>5</sup> and Lin Biao being criticized for the *duancu tuji* tactics, whereas at other times Braun has had this "honor."<sup>6</sup> (Of course, since the Maoist rewriting of history—beginning in the second half of the 1930s and evident in the 1945 "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions"<sup>7</sup>—Wang Ming has been held politically responsible for everything that went wrong in the first half of the 1930s, Bo Gu and Braun being regarded more or less as his political and military henchmen.)

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\* I would like to express my thanks to Jon Halliday for giving me the decisive nudge to translate and comment upon Braun's c.v.

In the West—excluding studies from the former Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic (GDR), where for both political and personal reasons Braun had a decidedly better press<sup>8</sup>—a tendency towards a negative appraisal of Braun's abilities can be found especially in recent more specialized studies which depend to a large degree on newly-available Chinese communist documents and scholarship.<sup>9</sup> Surprisingly, none of these recent studies cite the contemporary articles by Braun in the journal *Geming yu zhanzheng* (*Revolution and Warfare*) (see below). However, even knowing these articles Chi-hsi Hu (an earlier scholar whose studies of 1970 and 1980 seem to have been quite influential on later scholarship) was able to misrepresent Braun's statements considerably in the process of constructing a simplistic dichotomy between Mao and Lin Biao (capable) on the one hand and Braun (incapable) on the other.<sup>10</sup>

Other presentations, often covering more ground, mention Braun in a rather non-committal way, but argue that the various advantages held by the Nationalists were mostly responsible for the Communists' defeat.<sup>11</sup> In recent decades, only two studies seem to have gone even further, explicitly arguing that the Nationalists' superiority was the main factor for the Communists' defeat, but that Braun's tactics were not unsuited to and did about as well as could have been expected under the dire circumstances, including a Chinese Red Army which was sometimes itself less than capable.<sup>12</sup>

While most studies dealing with the CCP in the 1930s thus mention Otto Braun, some even assigning him an important role at one of the crucial moments of the Chinese revolution, and while his China memoirs serve as the only non-Maoist on-the-spot source for the time around the Long March,<sup>13</sup> there still exists no reliable biographical sketch of him in English<sup>14</sup> and probably only one in Chinese.<sup>15</sup> And although one can find quite reliable entries in a few German biographical dictionaries<sup>16</sup>, they are usually short and contain no references. In an attempt to remedy this relative lack of reliable information, I present here an annotated translation of a hitherto unpublished "curriculum vitae" prepared by Braun in 1969.<sup>17</sup>

The typewritten c. v., entitled "Biographische Angaben" (Biographical data) and signed by Braun, is dated 10 April 1969 and is headed by the name Otto Braun above his main Western pseudonym "K. O. Wagner" (Karl Ottovich (?) Wagner) in brackets.<sup>18</sup> I have tried to keep his "impersonal" style in translation; the numbers in brackets refer to the commentary below.

## TRANSLATION

Born in 1900 in Munich, grew up in a Catholic orphanage.[1] For seven years went to primary school, subsequently to a teachers' training college.[2] At the beginning of 1918 drafted to military service. Dismissed in December 1918 as "unreliable." [3] In the same month entered the Freie Sozialistische Jugend [FSJ, Free Socialist Youth], in April 1919 the KPD (Spartakus) [German Communist Party]. Participant and fellow-combatant of the Bayerische Räterepublik [Bavarian Soviet Republic]. Then actively working for the reconstruction of the FSJ in Southern Bavaria.[4] In summer 1919 moved to Northern Germany because of permanent police persecution.[5] Casual jobs in various cities, honorary party work mainly in Hamburg.[6] At the beginning of 1921 removal to Berlin and full-time party work in the party *apparat* of the CC [Central Committee]. Until 1923 substantially involved in the setup of the military-political organization and of the intelligence service on a national scale.[7] As a liaison to the CC participant in the middle German defensive battles in 1921, the so-called Märzaktion [March campaign], among other places in the Leunawerk.[8] In summer 1921 carried out the sensational "Aktenraub" [theft of records] from Oberst Freyberg, the European representative of the white guard ataman Semjonow. Imprisonment and illegality.[9] In spring 1923 a stay at the party school, subsequently editor in Berlin and Suhl. Participated in the setup and control of the proletarian Hundertschaften [paramilitary groups of about 100 people each] in Southern Thuringia. In winter 1923/24 Org.-Sekretär [secretary responsible for organization] of the illegal Bezirksleitung [regional command] Thuringia.[10]

After the Frankfurt party congress, in spring 1924, recall to Berlin as Abwehrleiter [head of counter-intelligence] and member of the military-political commission at the CC.[11] Author of numerous articles in "Hefte vom Bürgerkrieg" [Civil War Pamphlets] and "Oktober" as well as of the "Spitzelalmanach" [catalogue of police informers].[12] In 1925 responsible for the security of the Berlin party congress.[13]

In autumn 1926 arrested.[14] In spring 1928 violent rescue from the Berlin remand prison in Moabit and emigration to the Soviet Union.[15] Guest delegate at the VI World Congress of the Comintern.[16] Assigned to the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division. From 1929 to 1932 attendance at the Frunze Military Academy. Concurrently teaching at the Lenin School and in military-political courses of the Comintern. Theoretical and historical studies on armed uprisings, tactics of street fighting, etc.[17]

In spring 1932, after graduating from the military academy[18], by order of the intelligence department of the Soviet General Staff participation in the war of resistance against the Japanese occupiers in Manchuria.[19] In autumn 1932 removal to Shanghai as military advisor of the representative of the ECCI [Executive Committee of the Communist International] to the CC of the CCP.<sup>19</sup>[20] At the request of the CC made available to it and infiltrated to the Central Soviet Area.[21] There assigned to the Revolutionary War Council and to the Main Staff of the Central Army Group of the Chinese Red Army. Eye-witness and participant of the civil war battles in South China, of the Long March, and of the early part of the Anti-Japanese War.[22] In autumn 1939 return flight to Moscow and exclusion from all military-political and Far Eastern affairs.[23]

In 1940/41 editor and translator of marxist and belletristic literature at the Moscow Foreign Language Press. 1941 to 1946 Polit-Instrukteur in P.O.W. camps for German, later also Japanese, officers.[24] 1946 to 1948 lecturer at the antifascist central school in Krasnogorsk near Moscow.[25] Since 1948 again working at the Foreign Language Press. From 1950 on free-lance translator, member of the Soviet Writers' Association.[26]

In 1954 repatriated.[27] Until 1961 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter [fellow] at the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the CC of the SED [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, i.e., the East German Communist Party] as main editor of the German edition of Lenin's works. Besides, literary activity and military-political propaganda, the latter mainly at the presidency of the Urania (Gesellschaft zur Verbreitung wissenschaftlicher Kenntnisse) [Society for the Distribution of Scientific Knowledge]. Various publications on both fields.[28] 1961 to 1963 First Secretary of the German Writers' Association.[29] Since then pensioner and again free-lance translator of Soviet literary works.[30]

#### COMMENTARY

[1] Braun was born in Ismaning near Munich on 28 September 1900 (at 6.45 a.m.) as fourth of five children.<sup>20</sup> That he is identical to Li De/Otto Braun in China is proved by police photographs taken in 1926<sup>21</sup>; further interesting photographs accompany Julius Mader's obituary on Braun.<sup>22</sup> Braun's father, Willibald, had been a small-scale trader and accountant in Germany and Austria; around the turn of the century he was manager of the Erste Bayerische Krautverwertungsgenossenschaft (i.e., a sauerkraut cooperative) in Ismaning, in one of whose buildings Otto was actually born. Since Otto's father soon died

(on 13 September 1902, due to liver cirrhosis)<sup>23</sup>, his mother Amanda, née Bogenberger, a primary school teacher, had to put Otto into a kind of municipal orphanage in Weyarn near Munich in 1906, when he was old enough to be sent to school.<sup>24</sup>

[2] Seven years was normal for the primary school attached to the orphanage in Weyarn. From summer 1913 Braun went to the teachers' training college in Pasing near Munich.<sup>25</sup>

[3] According to an unpublished manuscript by Braun entitled "Erinnerungen I: Wie ich zur Arbeiterbewegung gekommen bin" [Remembrances I: How I got into the workers' movement], already in 1917 he had been working as a farm-hand, a stoker and a scribe during his school holidays.<sup>26</sup> At the beginning of May 1918, he had passed "emergency examinations" for his career as a primary school teacher, then he was drafted on 25 June 1918 into the Bavarian army, finally to be sent to a frontier guard battalion at the end of October. On 26 November 1918 he was demobilized. Whether this early date was due to any personal "unreliability" or to the general demobilization or dissolution of his unit cannot currently be firmly established, although I tend to favor the latter explanation.<sup>27</sup>

[4] It is as yet impossible to establish Braun's exact role in the events in Bavaria in 1919. He may have played a minor role, especially during the "communist" Bavarian Soviet Republic (mid-April to the beginning of May 1919), and he was certainly arrested for a short time after the bloody suppression of the Soviet Republic, though the case against him was dismissed. His own unpublished remembrances of the "baptism of fire"<sup>28</sup> are at variance with an anonymous description published in 1928<sup>29</sup>; and both of them clash with the few facts that can be established from contemporary records.<sup>30</sup>

[5] In fact, Braun was again attending the final class at the teachers' training college, where he passed his final examinations in the middle of June 1919. Considering the extreme discrimination against communists at the time, either he was much less involved in the events than he claims, or he was very successful in obscuring his role. Again contrary to his later claims,<sup>31</sup> he was even admitted to teaching at primary schools in Munich but asked to be granted leave of absence, which was refused. At the end of November, after he had not reported for duty, his mother told a school-official that she thought that Otto had gone to

northern Germany to work for the communists. Braun himself asked on 5 December 1919 to be temporarily dismissed as a teacher; the formal dismissal, not precluding readmission within two years if Braun still met the standards then, was dated 15 January 1920.<sup>32</sup>

[6] This is a badly documented period in Braun's life. During the second half of 1920, Braun was again registered in Munich, living at his mother's address. On 29 April 1920 he left the Catholic church; more than a year later than claimed by him in his "Erinnerungen II."<sup>33</sup>

[7] The best study yet on the intelligence service(s) of the KPD was written by former members of the "Stasi" (GDR state security); however, it is still far from satisfactory.<sup>34</sup> It confirms his activity especially in the military-political *apparat* by using archival sources different from the ones cited in my 1991 study.

[8] This refers to the communist "Mitteldeutscher Aufstand" in March 1921. The Leunawerk was an important chemical factory near Merseburg. According to Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, p. 44, Braun was responsible for KPD intelligence in middle Germany at that time.

[9] On 23 July 1921 several people entered the Berlin flat of the Russian colonel Freyberg (he is called von Freyburg in Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, p. 53), claiming to be policemen and to have to search the flat. They took all records along, but one of them—Braun, as it turned out later—left a briefcase in a taxi and thus could be arrested on 28 July. Most of his accomplices, mainly Communist Party members, were also arrested, but not the one or two Russians who also participated; they probably were the instigators of the action and spirited the files away since they were most useful to the Soviet government and its intelligence services. In the course of the trial—the charge was preferred on 28 September 1921, the trial began on 22 February 1922 but was soon adjourned—Braun was able to pass himself off as an agent of conservative groups by alleging that Freyberg was spying for Poland and France. The nationalist press, at first having loudly protested the "communist activities," thereafter became markedly reticent, whereas the communist press started a big campaign against the "Lockspitzel Oskar" ("Oskar, the stool-pigeon"; Oskar being one of Braun's aliases at the time). The sentence for aiding and abetting false assumption of authority—Braun was not sentenced for theft—was pro-

claimed on 9 May 1922 and was quite lenient: seven months' imprisonment, less one month detention (Braun had been under arrest between 28 July and 15 September 1921, when bail was granted and paid). However, Braun did not yet go to prison: he made various petitions for mercy; when those were refused he simply could not be found—he went "underground."<sup>35</sup>

[10] In 1922 Braun founded an "independent" press bureau, "Coruna," in Berlin, which helped him get into contact with right-wing circles, then being watched by the Communists ever more attentively. In 1923 he seems to have been in Thuringia for much of the time. (Among other things, Thuringia, especially the region of Suhl, was important because of its arms factories.) He had parted from his first wife, whom he had married in 1921, and was soon to meet Olga Benario, who later was to become a heroine in the GDR due to her death in KZ Ravensbrück under the Nazis.<sup>36</sup>

According to Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, p. 100, Braun worked for KPD counter-intelligence until September 1923, when he became head of party organization in Thuringia. Another GDR study states that he became a member of the Central Revolutionary Committee of the KPD at the beginning of October 1923, in preparation for the fateful bungled "October uprising," which led to the KPD being banned by General Hans von Seeckt, later military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek while Braun was in China. Among his comrades in the Central Revolutionary Committee were Wilhelm Pieck and Heinz Neumann (later of Canton Commune "fame"); among those at a regional level were Arthur Ewert and Wilhelm Florin.<sup>37</sup>

[11] At that time a heated dispute took place between the "Leftists" in the KPD around Ruth Fischer and Arkadi Maslow, on the one hand, and the Comintern on the other, with Braun taking the latter's side.<sup>38</sup> The Frankfurt party congress, the ninth, was held in April 1924; the party had been legalized again in March 1924.

[12] Braun refers to the first "Spitzelalmanach" for 1919/1924.<sup>39</sup> It is interesting to note that Braun's articles in 1924/25 in the illegal party journal *Bürgerkriegshefte* are mostly about intelligence and counter-intelligence matters,<sup>40</sup> whereas later articles in *Oktober* (the replacement for the *Bürgerkriegshefte*) and *Die Internationale* more often seem to be concerned with military-political matters.<sup>41</sup> These articles were also reflections of the military-political and intelligence courses which Braun at least partially prepared

and held. The "syllabi" of these courses, the so-called "Braun-Material," have been published in German, though without an explicit attribution to Braun or Benario, with whom they had been found.<sup>42</sup>

[13] The Berlin party congress, the tenth, was held in July 1925. About this time Braun left the "Nachrichtenzentrale" (intelligence headquarters) to concentrate on "international work."<sup>43</sup> According to documents by Braun to be found in the SED party archive in Berlin, Braun did not sever his ties with the KPD *apparat*, but at the end of 1925 additionally began to work for the Russian intelligence service GPU.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, Olga Benario entered Soviet Military Intelligence in 1925, and Braun applied for enrollment in the Soviet Red Army in 1926, which was refused.<sup>45</sup>

[14] After having been temporarily arrested in Nuremberg on 15 August 1926 under a false name (some of his pseudonyms were Dr. Gärtner, Oskar Schumann, Karl Wagner, Erwin Tesch, and Arthur Brand), he was observed teaching a military course on 15 September 1926 at an inn in Berlin. After further surveillance he was arrested on 30 September 1926.<sup>46</sup> At the time, Braun was in the company of Beppo Römer, leader of the right-wing organization "Bund Oberland."<sup>47</sup>

Braun's activities and intentions up to his arrest are difficult to establish, except that he seems to have been busy travelling and that there are indications that he was still concentrating on right-wing circles, presumably on Moscow's orders. (Right-wingers often had good contacts with the German army, which was cooperating quite intensively with the Soviet Red Army in the Weimar era). Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution*, p. 80–81, having had access to an otherwise unspecified "personal secret file"<sup>48</sup> on Braun in Moscow, cites Braun: "An operation had to be screened, which had been undertaken on the orders of the head of the Fourth Department of the Red Army," i.e., the GRU. This operation, according to Waack, involved an attack on a Reichswehr barracks. To disguise the involvement of Russians, Braun had to be arrested and part of his *apparat* destroyed. The whole story, however, does not ring true, especially the part that Braun's arrest somehow helped disguise the foreign involvement. To the contrary, Braun was soon connected by German police with an enigmatic Dane, Laursen, who seems really to have been a Soviet agent and who was exchanged with the Russians in 1927.<sup>49</sup> It also leaves open the question for which Russian service(s) Braun was actually working.

[15] For the first four weeks, Braun had been in detention, then he served the six months of his sentence in the Freyberg case, then he was again in detention, charged with high treason and other crimes; the indictment against "Otto Braun, writer" ran to nearly a hundred pages.<sup>50</sup> Already on 25 February 1928 the Communists attempted to free him when he was brought from Moabit Prison to a civil court to be divorced from his first wife. On 11 April 1928 a group of Communists, at its head Olga Benario, succeeded in freeing Braun in the first such escape from Moabit Prison, creating a sensation that was reported even beyond Germany. The operation then became a propaganda victory for the Communists due to the participation of a woman and to the fact that the revolvers that had been brandished by the group had been unloaded. However, it is still unknown who really planned the operation, with Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution*, p. 82, naming Hans Kippenberger (head of all KPD intelligence), whereas Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, p. 162, finger Hermann Dünow, head of KPD counter-intelligence. Braun obviously being out of the country by summer, the trial against him fizzled out; he was pardoned in July 1928 and May 1929 in a very lenient way.<sup>51</sup>

Braun's time in Germany was quite important to his further life: he had experienced war while still young and had become a Communist at a time of national defeat and in the middle of the 1918/19 revolution, which had disturbed the bearings of many Germans as much as had been the case for Chinese in the 1911/12 revolution and the May Fourth movement combined. He also had learned to do intelligence work, to organize, and to love military tactics—which is not to say he always appeared or actually was very competent.

There is a tendency to identify Braun with concepts of positional warfare, based on his service in the First World War.<sup>52</sup> Yet Braun was very much a child of the post-World War I period, whose interest and experience lay in street-fighting and partisan tactics—badly armed small groups against a nominally superior enemy—where intelligence (in both meanings of the word), a certain measure of support by "the people," and what Sun Zi called *dao* could be decisive. Thus, in some places the gulf between Braun's experiences and those of his Chinese comrades was far narrower than is often assumed.

[16] This congress took place from 17 July to 1 September 1928.

[17] No study of Braun's stays in the Soviet Union has yet been made, for which, of course, the Russian records are indispensable; however, there is not much reason to doubt his statements. He had separated from Olga Benario, who

would later go with Luis Carlos Prestes to Brazil, where she would meet Arthur Ewert, who had been sent there by the Comintern after his stay in Shanghai.<sup>53</sup> On a journey to the Caucasus Braun met his old mentor from the FSJ in Munich, Alfred Kurella, in Suchumi in autumn 1929, with whom he would go mountaineering (one of Braun's favorite hobbies) in the Soviet Union after the Second World War.<sup>54</sup> On the Comintern's Lenin school see the articles by Babitschenko and Herlemann; a full-scale study is still missing.<sup>55</sup> While in the Soviet Union, Braun wrote essays on the "Red Army and Imperialist War," on the tactics of street fighting, and on the 1923 Hamburg uprising (where, ironically, his later superior in China, Manfred Stern, had been involved), as well as a booklet on his escape from prison, entitled "Moabit."<sup>56</sup> In November 1931 Braun asked a special commission of the ECCI to relieve him from work for the secret *apparat* of the KPD.<sup>57</sup>

[18] According to Mader, "Otto Braun," p. 28, upon graduation Braun was given the rank of regimental commander. Graduating from the Frunze Military Academy was probably as prestigious as finishing West Point.

[19] This should once and for all clear up the question of by whom Braun was sent to China. It fits in well both with Braun's stay in Harbin—especially as told in the serialized version of his memoirs<sup>58</sup>—and with Braun's taking money to Richard Sorge in Shanghai in an attempt to buy the Noulens' freedom.<sup>59</sup> Unusually, in a questionnaire in the SED party archives in Berlin, under "activities" Braun listed "resident for the Fourth Department of the General Staff in Harbin."<sup>60</sup> What Xie Yibiao calls the "lively dispute" among Chinese party historians in recent years on the question of Braun's status at the time of his arrival in China is therefore partly outdated.<sup>61</sup>

[20] In the serialized version of his memoirs, Braun uses practically the same words, but additionally describes his duty in Shanghai as "new," as contrasted with his participation in the anti-Japanese war in Harbin.<sup>62</sup> As I have pointed out elsewhere, the Comintern bureau in Shanghai included a "military section" staffed and financed presumably by the Soviet Red Army and its intelligence service.<sup>63</sup> It is unknown why Braun was ordered to Shanghai; possible reasons include Japanese-occupied Harbin getting too "hot" for him and the "real" advisor, Manfred Stern, being late.<sup>64</sup> When Stern finally arrived sometime in 1933, Braun was subordinated to him; a situation presumably not very palatable to Braun.<sup>65</sup>

As to Braun being a (political) Comintern advisor in the tradition of, e.g., Maring, Voitinsky or Heinz Neumann, and thus having the Comintern's authority directly behind him, this has to be denied—the political advisor was, without doubt, Arthur Ewert.<sup>66</sup> Therefore it does not make much sense to try to measure a "decline" in the quality of the Comintern by comparing Braun with Borodin,<sup>67</sup> the more so as Borodin was originally sent by the CC of the CPSU to the Guomindang with orders to advise it without consideration of the introduction of Communism to China.<sup>68</sup>

[21] I have grave doubts about the "request" part of this statement. It seems much more likely that Stern, like his predecessors since at least early 1931, was meant to go to Ruijin but failed, whereupon Braun was sent and succeeded.<sup>69</sup> On the other hand, it does not seem to be known whether Bo Gu or Luo Fu had met Stern at all, therefore a special request by them for a military advisor could have called for Braun, whom they met weekly in Shanghai.<sup>70</sup> Anyway, it would seem logical that in September 1933 Braun went to Ruijin as "military advisor without jurisdiction." His superior in military matters was Stern, who returned to Moscow in summer or autumn 1934, with Braun's status afterwards something to be guessed at. There is no indication in favor of Braun having had any political authority, whereas, for example, his lack of communications with the Comintern strongly argues against his having had any. At a time when military matters ruled and military and political affairs were often hard to separate, it should come as no surprise if Braun punched somewhat above his weight, especially since he seems to have had the ear of Bo Gu and was on the spot. (Though I still wonder whether Chinese accounts might conflate the activities and views of Braun in late 1933 and the first half of 1934 with those of Ewert and especially Stern). However, when he was no longer backed by Stern and/or Ewert (or speaking for them), Braun was soon trimmed to his "real" size, without producing trouble with the Comintern for the CCP.

[22] As already noted at the beginning, how Braun's role in China, most of all during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the first stage of the Long March, should be judged is subject to some controversy. One of the reasons is certainly the lack of sources, since there are no contemporary documents to throw light upon party-internal discussions. Of course, there are lots of later memoirs, but these can mostly be divided into pro-Braun (by himself) and anti-Braun (by CCP members), and apart from such biases their factual reliability is quite dubious, Braun's included.<sup>71</sup>

According to an interview Braun gave to a Russian journal, he had three duties in 1933/34: planning of strategy and tactics, military education, and help in commanding the Red Army.<sup>72</sup>

The first duty mainly involved his ideas concerning *duancu tuji*, which have certainly been often misunderstood both in China and the West. According to Braun's own conception, as conveyed in his articles in *Geming yu zhanzheng*, these "short, swift strikes" were actually intended to be parts of a mobile warfare campaign, rather than being expressions of the positional warfare mentality that scholars often attribute to Braun. In essence, they consisted of two- or three-pronged attacks on a tactical scale. Enemy units, usually ensconced in fortifications, were to be lured out by small diversionary units, then the main forces were to attack, ideally from the flanks, to encircle and annihilate them. In case of problems, the Red Army troops were to make quick but orderly retreats. (It should be noted that the *duancu tuji* could be explained as a small-scale tactical version of the "luring the enemy in deep" strategy/tactic allegedly invented by Mao Zedong.) There were further variants of *duancu tuji* and tactical measures associated with it, some predating Braun's publications, but they all seem to have been more defense-oriented, especially those by Xiang Ying.

Whether Braun's conception of *duancu tuji* was in fact executed on the battlefield is still in doubt. A further confusion arises from misunderstanding of the difference between strategy and tactics, and of the fact that *duancu tuji* was purely a tactical conception. Braun did make some proposals involving strategic considerations (such as favoring the use of regular troops to bear the brunt of the fighting, while at the same time promoting the employment of irregular forces for other purposes). However, as I shall show in my forthcoming essay on the antecedents of the Long March, in general strategy, and politics even more, were a different field. I do not doubt that *duancu tuji* was quite appropriate as a method for tactically implementing the strategic decisions taken by the CCP and Red Army leadership (in short: "stay and fight"), but it was probably less well suited to the capabilities of the Chinese Red Army and its officers. Yet even perfect execution would have been unlikely to win the military struggle against the overwhelming Nationalist forces.<sup>73</sup>

The second duty was connected with the Chinese Red Army Academy (*Hongda*), in whose reorganization in the second half of 1933 Braun may have had a hand.<sup>74</sup> In addition, Braun's numerous articles published in 1934 in *Geming yu zhanzheng* and in 1939 in *Ba lujun junzheng zazhi* [Military and political journal of the Eighth Route Army] and in *Zhongguo qingnian* [China Youth] should be mentioned here.<sup>75</sup>

The third duty is usually associated with the Guangchang battle and with the "Troika" (*Sanrentuan*) of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Braun.<sup>76</sup> At the battle of Guangchang in April 1934—a pivotal event in the history of the Jiangxi Soviet because it was the clearest sign that the end was near—Braun certainly played a leading role, presumably having organized a front command. (Whether in this case he exceeded his role as advisor is difficult to say.) Yet the extent of his share of the blame for the heavy defeat has not been established. It is far from understood what role Zhu De, also at the front, played and whether the actions of the army corps commanders (Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai) had much to do with Braun's concept of *duancu tuji*. Additionally, the remembrances of the participants, even on the Chinese side, can hardly be called consistent. A critical study of all available sources is sorely needed before coming to any verdict.

The Troika was, in my opinion, a special group established to make the necessary preparations for the "strategic transfer"; therefore it operated in near total secrecy and with considerable powers. Braun's membership indicates some importance, though it can hardly be used as evidence that he had usurped the military command. After all, Zhou Enlai had some military experience, too, and it would be logical to include the Comintern's military advisor, the more so if Braun really was among the first to consider the "strategic transfer" in earnest.<sup>77</sup> What can be assumed with some confidence is that Braun wrote the two quarterly plans (May–July, August–October) in preparation for the "transfer"; how much influence he actually had on the decisions taken remains unknown.<sup>78</sup>

Turning to the Long March, the problems in describing and assessing Braun's activities become even worse. Although this cannot be gathered from studies like Salisbury's or Benjamin Yang's, I do not believe that we can currently say much more about the internal struggles in the CCP and Red Army leadership than that they seem to have taken place.<sup>79</sup> After leaving the Jiangxi Soviet in October 1934, Braun never again played such a notable role in Red Army—and, by extension, CCP—affairs as he had as a member of the Troika, so he may be considered a "loser" of those struggles. It seems not to have mattered much that he stayed with Mao (somewhat surprisingly in view of the problems he is said to have had with him) after the First and the Fourth Front Army, the latter under the command of Zhang Guotao, separated in September 1935 with Zhu De, of all people, leaving with Zhang Guotao. However, shortly afterward he became a member of a newly-created "Reorganization Committee."<sup>80</sup>

In January 1936, Braun took part in his last high-level military meeting, debating the "Eastern Expedition."<sup>81</sup> On 27 January 1936, shortly before the

"Eastern Expedition" started, he wrote a letter to Party Central in which he argued against the expedition.<sup>82</sup>

His main occupation afterwards was teaching tactics (specifically, *duancu tuji*)—in the later stage at Kangda, the Red Army's anti-Japanese academy, and doing odd jobs for the general staff, for example, chairing a publications subcommittee of the "Military Research Committee" of the "Central Revolutionary Military Committee," advising the "rear staff," and creating and training a cavalry unit.<sup>83</sup> In 1938 he may have become a member of the CCP.<sup>84</sup>

As to opinions about Braun's personality in China, Salisbury, always a good source for the Chinese view on such matters, mentions quite a lot of self-confidence (if not arrogance) and Braun's "womanizing."<sup>85</sup>

However, there are no "neutral" sources on Braun's behavior before 1936. To foreigners later meeting him in Yan'an Braun seems to have been like a strange exhibit which did not really fit into the environment and was even superfluous: admired for the hardships he had endured; militarily competent, but without obvious influence; well-read and intelligent, yet hardly able to communicate in Chinese; somewhat reticent and even sad.<sup>86</sup> It is possible that, despite the warnings by Wang Ming about the purges, he longed to get back to the Soviet Union.<sup>87</sup> Whether he had any friends in Yan'an, except, presumably, his then-wife Li Lilian (who had arrived with Jiang Qing from Shanghai) and, perhaps, the American physician George Hatem, alias Ma Haide, seems doubtful.<sup>88</sup>

[23] Braun left China together with Zhou Enlai, who went to Moscow because of an illness. It is not definitively clear from the sources whether it was really the Comintern that called Braun back. GDR sources claim that after his arrival Braun found nobody in the "military apparatus" of the ECCI who still remembered him, but that a chance encounter with Walter Ulbricht, later the GDR's top politician, saved him from bigger harm.<sup>89</sup> According to a Chinese source, Braun was saved by the head of the International Control Commission of the Comintern, Wilhelm Florin.<sup>90</sup> How much Braun's stay in China and the problems he had on his return to Moscow—allegedly also because Mao Zedong, via Mao Zemin and Zhou Enlai, tried to denounce him<sup>91</sup>—influenced his further career is difficult to say at the moment (see also below).

[24] Among the German communists active in the propaganda war for the Soviet Union were many acquaintances of Braun, e.g., Ulbricht, Florin, Kurella and Pieck; but quite a lot of Germans later to take important positions in the GDR also went through these camps as P.O.W.s. Braun was working for the

Soviet Ministry for the Interior (NKVD)<sup>92</sup> in various P.O.W. camps, mainly at Oranki and at Yelabuga, though it is difficult to ascertain dates. In the camps he was known as "Kommissar Wagner."<sup>93</sup> Those P.O.W.s later to publish their memoirs in West Germany (Langmaack, Hahn, von Einsiedel) were quite scathing in their comments on Braun and his informers' system, as were various anonymous former P.O.W.s who were questioned in a large West German study and who graced Braun with comments like "bone-headed," "fanatical" and "radical."<sup>94</sup> Yet even East German authors are not really enthusiastic about Braun—cf. Dengler's comment in *Zwei Leben* that Braun tried to teach the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism but without much pedagogical ability—except for Kehler, who extols Braun's intellectual caliber and argues that at the beginning Braun simply had difficulties in regaining knowledge of the Germans' "Gedankenwelt." Von Einsiedel, *Tagebuch der Versuchung*, p. 35, on the other hand, argues that Braun had been in disgrace after his return from China and was now trying to curry favour by using every method possible.

Nevertheless, Braun played an important though little-known role in the development of the "Antifa-Bewegung," the anti-fascist movement among German P.O.W.s in the Soviet Union. At the end of May 1942, the first conference of captive German officers in the Soviet Union took place in P.O.W. Camp Ninety-Five in Yelabuga.<sup>95</sup> Braun was one of the main organizers of this conference, many of whose participants later became members of the "Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland" (National Committee for Free Germany; von Einsiedel had been vice-president of the NKFD). Yet Braun allegedly fell into disgrace later on, although, according to Hahn (*Ich spreche die Wahrheit!*, p. 74) he was smart enough. Perhaps the "unsurmountable hate" that his methods had created among the officers in Oranki<sup>96</sup> now had repercussions on Braun.

I have not been able to find a mention of Braun in the English-language literature on Japanese P.O.W.s in the Soviet Union.

[25] Head of the German section of this school was Wilhelm Zaisser, later the first minister for state security of the GDR. Considering that Braun's *guanxi* should by now have been excellent, one seriously begins to wonder why he did not reach a really important position then or later.

[26] Among Braun's translations in the early 1950s was, for example, V. N. Azhaev's Stalinist bestseller *Far from Moscow*.<sup>97</sup>



[27] After Stalin's death in 1953. Braun had asked several times after 1949 to be repatriated.<sup>98</sup> According to his widow, in 1954 Braun was meant to become head of the military academy in Dresden, but was refused the job by Ulbricht.

[28] Among his publications in the second half of the 1950s one can find an edition of articles on the 1918/19 revolution in Berlin, a translation of a Soviet study on Soviet-German relations between 1918 and 1922, an article in East Germany's leading newspaper on Lenin and military science, translations of Mikhail A. Sholokhov's post-war stories (among them "One Man's Destiny"), but also an essay on the theory of translating, published in 1959 yet still once citing Stalin's contributions to this field.<sup>99</sup> It is said that Braun was especially influential on East German reading habits in the 1950s and early 1960s because of his numerous translations of and introductions and afterwords to Russian literature.<sup>100</sup>

[29] At the beginning of 1963 the SED (the East German ruling party) and the GDR government signalled a change in cultural politics towards a more restrictive stance. Among those criticized at the sixth SED party congress in January 1963 were Stefan Hermlin, Hans Mayer, and Braun. As a result, Braun was replaced as First Secretary of the German Writers' Association. Ironically, his friend Alfred Kurella, who had also been repatriated in 1954, replaced the temporarily disgraced Hermlin.<sup>101</sup>

[30] During the 1960s Braun translated, for example, K. M. Simonov's *Comrades-in-Arms* and a Russian book on his colleague Richard Sorge.<sup>102</sup> But, of course, much more important was his article "In wessen Namen spricht Mao Tse-tung?" ["In whose name is Mao Zedong speaking?"], *Neues Deutschland*, 27 May 1964, p. 5, where the identity of Li De was revealed for the first time. In January 1969, Braun spoke at a conference on China in East Berlin, at the express wish of "Soviet comrades."<sup>103</sup> Soon afterwards, Braun became a "wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter" (fellow) at the Institute for Social Sciences at the CC of the SED and the East German journal *horizont* published the first version of his memoirs in 16 parts.<sup>104</sup> During the following years Braun prepared his memoirs in book form, also using his report to the Comintern made in 1939/40, which had been given by Moscow to the Chinese but had later been bought back, according to Braun's widow.<sup>105</sup> His *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen (1932–1939)* were published in East Berlin in 1973, a second edition appeared

in 1975. Translations were made, as far as I know, into Russian, Bulgarian, Polish, Hungarian, Mongolian, English<sup>106</sup> and Chinese.<sup>107</sup>

Braun, who had received the "Order of the Great Patriotic War, First Class" of the Soviet Union, the "Patriotic Order of Merit in Gold" and the "Karl-Marx Order" of the GDR, died on 15 August 1974 during a holiday at the Bulgarian Black Sea resort of Varna.<sup>108</sup>

Obituaries appeared in the East German *Neues Deutschland* and the West German news magazine *Der Spiegel*, but also in *The New York Times* and, a very short one, in the Soviet *Pravda*.<sup>109</sup> The Chinese population seems not to have been informed about his death at the time, whereas the past decade has seen more publications on Braun in Chinese than in any other language, as one can easily learn from the annual bibliographies in *Jindaishi yanjiu*. If only quantity would turn into quality.

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### Notes

<sup>1</sup> A translation of the resolution can be found in Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," *The China Quarterly*, no. 40, 1969, pp. 1–17. For translations of related documents see Tony Saich, *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party* (Armonk/NY: 1996), pp. 640–648.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 10 of the "Outline Resolution" begins: "The resolution also refers to Comrade Hua Fu's [i.e., Otto Braun's] rude method of leadership that caused some extremely abnormal phenomena in the Military Council." Saich, *The Rise to Power*, p. 642. In the following, Bo Gu, alias Qin Bangxian, *primus inter pares* in the Communist leadership, was criticized for having allowed Braun to become so powerful.

<sup>3</sup> E.g., Wu Xiuquan, *Wo de licheng [My life]*, Beijing 1984, p. 71f. (Wu had been one of Braun's interpreters in China); Wang Rongxian, "Weida de lishi zhuanzhe. Jinian Zunyi huiyi 60 zhounian" [A major historical turning point. Remembering the 60th anniversary of the Zunyi Conference], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, 1995, no. 1, pp. 8–12, here p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Edgar Snow, *Random Notes on Red China (1936–1945)*, (Cambridge/MA: 1957), p. 60. Also cf. Frederick S. Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion," *Republican China*, vol. 14, 1988, pp. 57–74.

<sup>5</sup> Translation according to the explanation in Harrison Salisbury, *The Long March* (London: 1985), p. 44. The dictionaries usually give "father of the emperor," more generally also "ruler."

<sup>6</sup> Kun Jun and Shi Da, "Juedingxingde lishi zhuanbian" [A decisive historical change], *Lishi yanjiu*, 1975, no. 1, pp. 17–23, here p. 18; Zhan Libo, "Pipan Lin Biao de 'Lun duancu tuji'" [Criticizing Lin Biao's "On short, swift strikes"], *Hongqi*, 1975, no. 1, pp. 39–44. Luo Fu (in 1943), "Cong Fujian shibian dao Zunyi huiyi" [From the Fujian Incident to the Zunyi Conference], in: *Zunyi huiyi wenxian [Documents on the Zunyi Conference]* (Beijing: 1985), pp. 76–80, here p. 79; Wu Xiuquan, "Zunyi huiyi de guanghui bu rong dianwu" [The splendor of the Zunyi Conference may not be besmirched], *Hongqi*, 1981, no. 21, pp. 13–19, here p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> Saich, *The Rise to Power*, pp. 1164–1179, contains a translation. Also cf. Tony Saich, "Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Resolution on Party History," in: Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, (Armonk/NY: 1995), pp. 299–338.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. A. S. Titov, "Otto Braun—Kommunist-Internacionalist," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1978, no. 1, pp. 138–140; Helmut Peters, "Einige Anmerkungen zu Otto Braun und seiner revolutionären Tätigkeit in China" [Some notes on Otto Braun and his revolutionary activity in China], *Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg*, Sonderheft, 1989, pp. 173–190. Titov knew Braun personally and a group around Peters had assisted Braun in the research for his China memoirs, according to Braun's widow.

<sup>9</sup> E.g., Salisbury, *The Long March*, p. 44; Thomas Kampen, "The Zunyi Conference and the Rise of Mao Zedong," *Internationales Asienforum*, 1986, no. 3–4, pp. 347–360, here p. 349; Benjamin Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, (Boulder/CO: 1990), p. 121 (though he also concludes on p. 116 that the Communists could not have won anyway).

<sup>10</sup> The most serious misreading concerns the question of Red Army blockhouses, with Hu arguing that Lin Biao wanted fewer "Red" blockhouses than Braun, and those only to start attacks against the Nationalist troops. Actually, Lin Biao recommended blockhouses also in mountainous terrain—something Braun thought unnecessary—and, exactly where Hu claims to cite him, exhorted the Red Army vigorously to defend such blockhouses. Braun, on the other hand, pleaded in one of his articles (with a nearly prophetic title) to erect as few blockhouses as possible and only at important strategic and tactical places, though he also argued, if less strongly than Lin Biao, for their defense. Hu Chi-hsi, "Hua Fu, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference," *The China Quarterly*, no. 43, 1970, pp. 31–46;

Hu Chi-hsi, "Mao, Lin Biao and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign," *The China Quarterly*, no. 82, 1980, pp. 250–280, especially pp. 257–258; Otto Braun, "Fandui qujie womende zhanshu" [Against the misinterpretation of our tactics], *Geming yu zhanzheng*, no. 4, 18 May 1934, pp. 1–7, here pp. 1–2; Freddy Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken in China (1932–1935) [Otto Braun's early activity in China (1932–1935)]* (München 1988), p. 106 (notes 309, 316), pp. 108–109 (notes 360, 362). For further discussion of Braun's military thinking, cf. Commentary 22.)

<sup>11</sup> E.g., Jerome Ch'en, "The Communist movement 1927–1937," in: John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (eds.), *Cambridge History of China*, vol. 13, Republican China 1912–1949, Part 2, (Cambridge: 1986), pp. 168–229, here pp. 206–208; Stephen Uhalley, *A History of the Chinese Communist Party* (Stanford/CA: 1988), pp. 48–49; Edward L. Dreyer, *China at War* (London: 1995), pp. 192–194.

<sup>12</sup> Frank J. Tarsitano, "The Collapse of the Kiangsi Soviet and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign," Ph.D. dissertation, St. John's University, New York 1979; Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*. Also cf. Peter Williams Donovan, *The Red Army in Kiangsi, 1931–1934* (Ithaca/NY: 1976), p. 120; Warren Kuo, *Analytical History of Chinese Communist Party* (Taipei: 1968), vol. 2, p. 629. Any assessment of Braun's abilities depends, of course, on the reading of the events in 1934, too, where I sometimes differ from the studies mentioned in the above footnotes. I am preparing an (English) essay on the Long March and its antecedents, where I shall present my views more broadly.

<sup>13</sup> Otto Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen (1932–1939)*, (East Berlin: 1973). It should be kept in mind that Braun's memoirs, even if non-Maoist, are nevertheless heavily biased, both for personal (to put him in a good light) and political reasons (they were explicitly written as a weapon in the fight against Maoism; see Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 367). There is the additional problem of Braun using unknown sources in the preparation of his memoirs in book form, often making it impossible to know whether his account is based on his recollections (either at the time of writing or at the time of his report to the Comintern in 1939/40) or on secondary literature.

<sup>14</sup> One of the most inaccurate examples is the entry on Braun ("Li T'e") by Richard C. Kagan in: Edwin Pak-wah Leung (ed.), *Historical Dictionary of Revolutionary China, 1839–1976*, (Westport/CT: 1992), pp. 215–217. It contains both incorrect data (Braun's birthdate is wrongly given as 1896; Braun was never sentenced to death, least of all in 1919; he was never in Spain or Latin America; he came to China in 1932, not 1933; he did not really "drop out of sight" between 1939 and 1960, he just became known in other capacities) and questionable—though in view

of the literature understandable—assertions (e.g., holding Braun responsible for the defeat at the battle of Guangchang in April 1934; giving a rehash of the Maoist “two-lines theory” with Mao on the one hand and the “28 Bolsheviks” and Braun on the other). Concerning these matters see also Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, or my forthcoming essay.

<sup>15</sup> There are Chinese short biographies of Braun that are surprisingly inaccurate, such as the one which states that Braun was born in 1906 and supported left-wing socialism before World War One! “Li De,” in *Zhongguo gemingzhong de Gongchan Guoji renwu* [Comintern people in the Chinese Revolution] (Chengdu: 1986), pp. 141–155, here p. 141. Wu Xiuquan (*My Life*, p. 67), like Edgar Snow, seems to have partially confused Braun with Manfred Stern, which may have been Braun’s intention (Braun introduced himself to Snow as Otto Stern; cf. Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* [Harmondsworth: 1972], pp. 546–547). For an analysis see Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, pp. 93–94. This has led to some problems for Chinese historians having to confront an elder party member with mere facts. Cf. Lu Hong, “Guanyu Li De zai Hua huodong he jige youguan wentide kaobian” [An examination of Li De’s activity in China and some related questions], in Shi Zhifu and Zhou Wenqi (eds.), *Li De yu Zhongguo geming (youguan ziliao)* [Li De and the Chinese Revolution (relevant materials)] (Beijing: 1987), pp. 228–242, here pp. 228–231; Du Wentang, “Zur Persönlichkeit Otto Brauns” [About Otto Braun’s personality], *Bulletin Faschismus/Zweiter Weltkrieg*, Sonderheft, 1989, pp. 156–171, here 161–162. Elsewhere, Wu’s version has been accepted without question, e.g., Da Xie, “‘Yu Zhongguo Hongjun yiqi zuozhande waiguoren’—Li De qiren qishi” [“A foreigner fighting with the Chinese Red Army”—Li De, the man and his work], *Dang’an yu lishi*, 1990, no. 3, pp. 66–71. The confusion even extends to Taiwan, cf. Lü Fangshang, “Li De,” in *Zhongguo xiandai shi cidian—renwu bufen* [Dictionary of modern Chinese history—biographical section], Taipei 1985, p. 122 (Braun is said to have participated in the civil war in Soviet Russia in 1919). I wonder whether all this confusion in China has now been finally cleared up.

On the other hand, the above-mentioned book edited by Shi and Zhou contains on pp. 303–332 correct biographical data on Braun, with the parts concerning his life outside China being based on his articles from 1964 and 1974 in the East German newspaper *Neues Deutschland* (see below). The substantial part on his China stay is, alas, weighed down by the typical ideological burden (assertions that policies followed by the party leadership at the time constituted a “Left” deviation, a ritual denunciation of Wang Ming, etc.).

<sup>16</sup> The best and most recent example is the entry in *Wer war Wer in der DDR* [Who Was Who in the GDR] (Frankfurt am Main: 1995), pp. 95–96.

<sup>17</sup> Research by various people in German and Russian archives, especially on his life after 1939, may allow a full-scale biography of Braun to be written in a couple of years, though there does not seem to be any comprehensive effort at the moment. Then we may also get a better picture of his personality than the scattered impressions given here.

<sup>18</sup> A copy of this document was given to me years ago by Braun’s last wife in Berlin. (His last but one, married in the early 1950s in the Soviet Union, also seems to be still living in Berlin.) She is now no longer on speaking terms with me—probably because the document presented here contains Braun’s admission that he had been working for Soviet Military Intelligence, something she always strenuously denied.

<sup>19</sup> The sentence originally read: “In autumn 1932 removal to Shanghai as military advisor of the ECCI to the CC of the CCP.” The addition “of the representative” is hand-written—and important.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example: Erzbischöfliches Archiv, München: Taufbuch (parish register), St. Johann Baptist, Ismaning. There are further contemporary sources which confirm without doubt that Braun was born in 1900, not 1901 as some authors have claimed, such as Dieter Heinzig, “Die kommunistische Konkurrenz: Das Erbe der sowjetischen Militärberaterschaft—Die Tätigkeit Otto Brauns in der chinesischen Roten Armee” [The Communist competition: The legacy of the Soviet military advisory group—Otto Braun’s activity in the Chinese Red Army], in: Bernd Martin (ed.), *Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927–1938* [The German Military Advisory Group in China 1927–1938] (Düsseldorf: 1981), pp. 147–159, here p. 155; Yves Chevrier, Alain Roux, “Braun, Otto,” in: Lucien Bianco, Yves Chevrier (eds.), *Dictionnaire Biographique du Mouvement Ouvrier International—La Chine* [Biographical Dictionary of the International Workers’ Movement—China] (Paris: 1985), pp. 81–85, here p. 81; Branko Lazitch, Milorad Drachkovitch (eds.), *Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern* (Stanford/CA: 1986), p. 44.

<sup>21</sup> These can be found in the Staatsarchiv München: Pol. Dir. München 15510. One can compare them with the well-known photograph in his China memoirs (Otto Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, before p. 241) or the photograph in Otto Braun, “Von Schanghai bis Jänan” [From Shanghai to Yan’an], *horizont*, 1969, no. 37, p. 32.

<sup>22</sup> Julius Mader, “Otto Braun—leidenschaftlicher Internationalist” [Otto Braun—a passionate internationalist], *horizont*, 1974, no. 38, pp. 28–29. This should settle what Salisbury refers to as the “problem” of ascertaining whether Braun was

German or Austrian, which was presumably caused by Wu Xiuquan's statements (see above). Salisbury, *The Long March*, p. 38.

<sup>23</sup> Erzbischöfliches Archiv, München: Totenbuch (death register), St. Johann Baptist, Ismaning.

<sup>24</sup> More details and citations of primary sources on Braun's life up to 1928 can be found in: Freddy Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland 1900–1928" [Otto Braun in Germany 1900–1928], *Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, vol. 27, 1991, pp. 171–182. This article is based on a range of official records held in archives in Munich, Berlin and Potsdam (the latter should by now have been relocated to Berlin), on contemporary newspaper reports, and on later biographical compilations.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 172.

<sup>26</sup> A copy of this document as well as of the second part (see below) is in my possession.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 172. Braun has described his experience of the disintegrating German army during the final months of the First World War in his article "Gegen die "weiße" Schlinge" [Countering the "white" noose], *Neue Berliner Illustrierte*, 1968, no. 45, p. 38.

<sup>28</sup> "Erinnerungen II: Die Feuertaufe"; also cf. Braun, "Gegen die "weiße" Schlinge."

<sup>29</sup> Anon., "Otto Braun, der Flüchtling aus Moabit" [Otto Braun, the fugitive from Moabit], *Neue Zeitung*, 19 April 1928.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," pp. 173–174.

<sup>31</sup> Braun, "Erinnerungen II"; A. S. Titov, "K 80-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Otto Brauna" [On the 80th birthday of Otto Braun], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1980, no. 3, pp. 160–164, here p. 160.

<sup>32</sup> Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 172. As one can see from the files, everyone kept to the bureaucratic rules.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 174.

<sup>34</sup> Bernd Kaufmann et al., *Der Nachrichtendienst der KPD 1919–1937 [The KPD's intelligence service 1919–1937]*, (Berlin: 1993).

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," pp. 174–176.

<sup>36</sup> Various biographies have been written about her, the most recent by William Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution. Olga Benario und die deutsche Revolte in Rio [The forgotten revolution. Olga Benario and the German uprising in Rio]* (Berlin: 1994). The original appeared in São Paulo in 1993 under the title *Camaradas [Comrades]* and contains notes and an index, but references here will be made to the German edition.

<sup>37</sup> Paul Heider et al., *Geschichte der Militärpolitik der KPD (1918–1945) [History of the KPD's military politics]*, (East Berlin: 1987), p. 126. Also cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," pp. 176–177.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, pp. 99–101; Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 178.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, pp. 134–139, 161.

<sup>40</sup> E.g., K. W. (i.e., Otto Braun), "Abwehr" [Counter-intelligence], *Bürgerkriegshefte*, January 1925.

<sup>41</sup> E.g., K. W., "Der Reichswehretat von 1926" [The Reichswehr budget in 1926], *Die Internationale*, 9, 1926, Heft 5, pp. 142–146. Also cf. the analysis of Braun's articles in the 1928 indictment, noted below, especially pp. 68–71, 76–84.

<sup>42</sup> Ernst Ritter (ed.), *Reichskommissar für Überwachung der öffentlichen Ordnung und Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Inneren—Lageberichte (1920–1929) und Meldungen (1929–1933) [Reichskommissar for the surveillance of public order and Intelligence Collecting Center of the Interior Ministry of the Reich—situation reports (1920–1929) and messages (1929–1933)]*, München 1979 (on microfiches). The "Braun-Material" can be found under R 134/31 and R 134/32. The original documents are held by the Bundesarchiv (German federal archives).

<sup>43</sup> Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, p. 101.

<sup>44</sup> Information by Bernd-Rainer Barth, Berlin. There is a slight possibility that Braun actually wrote "GRU" (the abbreviation for Soviet Military Intelligence), but used the Cyrillic "R" which reads like the Latin "P," although mention of an "international department" also points to the GPU, successor of the Cheka and predecessor of the KGB.

<sup>45</sup> Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution*, p. 78; Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 178.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," pp. 178–179; Kaufmann et al., *Nachrichtendienst*, p. 161.

<sup>47</sup> Römer later also changed his "public" allegiance to the Communists and was killed by the Nazis. Cf. Oswald Bindrich and Susanne Roemer, *Beppo Römer, ein Leben zwischen Revolution und Nation* [Beppo Römer, a life between revolution and nation] (Berlin: 1991).

<sup>48</sup> In Waack, *Camaradas*, p. 98, it is just called "pasta pessoal."

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 178.

<sup>50</sup> Copies can be found in various German repositories, for example in Landesarchiv Berlin: Generalstaatsanwalt bei dem Landgericht, Nr. 2644. Also see Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," p. 174.

<sup>51</sup> For more details cf. Litten, "Otto Braun in Deutschland," pp. 180–182.

<sup>52</sup> E.g., Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, pp. 80–81. However, Salisbury, *The Long March*, p. 42, defends Braun from such accusations by Chinese generals.

<sup>53</sup> On the separation, see Ruth Werner, *Olga Benario*, (East Berlin: 1961), chapter 3. Ruth Werner, alias Ursula Kuczynski alias Sonja, had herself been an agent for Soviet Military Intelligence; her biography of Benario, where Braun is called "Kurt" for unknown reasons, is to be read with caution. Cf. Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution*, pp. 76ff.

<sup>54</sup> Otto Braun, "Geburtstagskinder—Alfred Kurella zu seinem Sechzigsten" [Persons celebrating their birthday—On Alfred Kurella's 60th], *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, 1955, no. 5, pp. 152–154.

<sup>55</sup> Leonid G. Babitschenko, "Die Kaderschulung der Komintern" [The Comintern's cadre education], in: *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung* 1993, (Berlin: 1993), pp. 37–59; Beatrix Herlemann, "Der deutschsprachige Bereich an den Kaderschulen der Kommunistischen Internationale" [The German-speaking section of the Comintern's cadre schools], *Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, vol. 18, 1982, pp. 205–229, especially the section on the military-political school, pp. 223–229.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. A. Titov, "Eighty years of Otto Braun's birth," *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1980, no. 4, pp. 141–147, here p. 143. "Moabit" was originally published in Russian in Moscow in 1929; parts of it were republished in Russian and English in *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1978, no. 1, pp. 141–148; *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1978, no. 2, pp. 117–127; and in Chinese in Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, pp. 333–349. It is, unsurprisingly, not always a reliable guide to the events.

<sup>57</sup> Information by Peter Huber, Geneva, from the Comintern Archives.

<sup>58</sup> Otto Braun, "Von Schanghai bis Jänan," *horizont*, no. 23, p. 32.

<sup>59</sup> Frederick S. Litten, "The Noulens Affair," *The China Quarterly*, no. 138 (1994), pp. 492–512, here p. 497.

<sup>60</sup> Information by Bernd-Rainer Barth.

<sup>61</sup> Liu Jiecheng, "Li De shi Gongchan Guoji pailaide junshi guwen ma?" [Was Li De a military advisor sent by the Comintern?], *Guangming Ribao*, 18 October 1992, p. 3 (Braun was sent by Soviet Military Intelligence, not by the Comintern, and was not even legitimized by the Comintern while active in the Jiangxi Soviet; based mainly on the recollections of Shi Zhe and Chinese biographies of Wang Ming); Liu Zhiqing, "Li De bushi Gongchan Guoji pailaide junshi guwen ma?—Yu Liu Jiecheng shangque" [Wasn't Li De a military advisor sent by the Comintern?—A discussion with Liu Jiecheng], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, 1994, no. 3, pp. 77–80 (Braun was sent by the Comintern; based on "logical" arguments, Liu Jiecheng's sources and Wu Xiuquan's recollections); Fei Kanru, "Ye tan Li De shi shui pilai Zhongguode" [Once more on who sent Li De to China], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, 1995, no. 2, pp. 90–92, 61 (Braun was sent by Soviet Military Intelligence, how he became the Comintern's military advisor still has to be researched; based also on East German publications); Xie Yibiao, "Guanyu Li De lai Hua yu zai Hua shenfende tantao" [A discussion of Braun's status at his arrival in China and during his stay in China], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, 1996, no. 1, pp. 81–85 (Braun was sent to China by Soviet Military Intelligence, then he became the Comintern's military advisor to the CCP; based on Chinese and non-Chinese publications). All of the authors cite quite few references, none of them cites any of my publications.

<sup>62</sup> Braun, "Von Schanghai bis Jänan," *horizont* no. 23, 1969, p. 32. There is no comparable statement in his *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*.

<sup>63</sup> Litten, "Noulens Affair," p. 505. Also cf. Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution*, p. 73.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, p. 17.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, p. 17–18; Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution*, p. 73. For a contrasting view see David P. Hornstein, *Arthur Ewert* (Lanham: 1993), p. 166 (but see the next note).

Manfred Stern, also known as Fred and as General Kléber, was born on 20 January 1896 in Woloka in the North Bukovina, then part of Austria-Hungary. He studied medicine at the University of Vienna; at the beginning of the First World War he was drafted into military service, but was taken prisoner by the Russian army in 1916. Staying in Russia, he participated in the organisation of the "International-

ists" fighting against White Guard Russians and the foreign interventions, and became an officer in the Soviet Red Army, also taking courses at the Frunze Military Academy. As military advisor (in Germany in 1923) and as an agent of the Profintern (the Trade Union International), Stern was often outside the Soviet Union. After his stay in China and further work in the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, he went to Spain in July 1936 as first commander of the XI International Brigade, defending Madrid. In spring 1938 he was recalled to Moscow and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. A camp-surgeon in the infamous prison camp in Magadan (in northeastern Siberia), he died there on 18 February 1954. A. G. Krymov, "Manfred Shtern—General Kleber," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1978, no. 1, pp. 59–67 (he does not mention Stern having been a prisoner for the last 16 years of his life); *In den Fängen des NKWD [In the claws of the NKVD]*, Berlin 1991, p. 230. Two of Stern's brothers, Leo and Wolf, became quite well-known in the GDR, the first as an historian, the second as an officer and military historian. Cf. *Wer war Wer in der DDR*, pp. 712–713. Stern's role in China is extremely difficult to elucidate, since there are currently only two not quite satisfactory sources: Braun's *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen* and Krymov's article. Also cf. Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion," pp. 66–67.

<sup>66</sup> Arthur Ewert, also known as Harry Berger, was born on 13 November 1890 in Heinrichswalde in East Prussia. In 1908 he joined the German Socialist Party and later emigrated to Canada; after the First World War he returned to Germany and joined the KPD, soon to become an important member. Since he was considered a "centrist," he had his share of problems with the "Leftists" in 1924/25 and stayed some time in Moscow. After the "Leftists" had been weakened in 1925, he again became a member of the CC, of the secretariat and, additionally, of the Politburo of the KPD. Later on, he worked illegally under the name "Braun"! Until 1928 he was probably the most important KPD leader beside Ernst Thälmann; he was a member of the German Reichstag (parliament) from 1928 to 1930, yet he soon lost out in the party-internal fights, being called a "Versöhnler" [appeaser]. He then engaged in working for the Comintern in the U.S., in South America, in China, and finally in Brazil, where he was arrested in late 1935. Pardoned in 1945, his sister brought him in 1947 to East Germany, where he spent the rest of his life in a sanitarium, since after torture by the Brazilian police and dubious treatments in a Brazilian mental asylum his mind was broken. He died on 3 July 1959; the funeral oration was held by one of his predecessors in Shanghai, Gerhart Eisler. Ewert's wife, called "Sabo," whom Braun had likewise known from Berlin, had also been arrested in Brazil, as had been Olga Benario, but both were extradited to Nazi Germany (on the personal wish of Heinrich Himmler), where they were killed in KZ Ravensbrück. Cf. Waack, *Die vergessene Revolution*, especially pp. 64–70, 294; Jürgen Mothes, "Briefe aus Montevideo—Arthur Ewert und die Wandlung von Luis Carlos Prestes zum Kommunisten" [Letters from Montevideo—Arthur Ewert and Luis Carlos Prestes'

conversion to communism], in: *Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung 1994* (Berlin: 1994), pp. 225–253, especially pp. 226–227.

Ewert's activity in China has not really been studied, although Hornstein, *Ewert*, devotes a chapter to it in his book. However, without detailed documentation the claims in his study cannot be substantiated, and therefore its potential worth is seriously compromised. To give just two examples: On p. 162, Hornstein claims that the Shanghai Municipal Police "recorded Braun in his true name in their Comintern agent listings almost immediately on his arrival in Shanghai." Yet he does not provide an exact source for this assertion, and the Shanghai Municipal Police files in the National Archives, to which he presumably refers, are quite voluminous. On p. 166 he describes the arrival of Manfred Stern in considerably more and different detail than does Braun in his *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 40, but this time there is not even a hint where his information comes from. As in the case of Stern, only the use of the Russian archives may allow us to get an impression of Ewert's China stay and its possible importance to CCP affairs. Also cf. the cautious German review of Hornstein's book by Reiner Tosstorff in *Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, vol. 32, 1996, pp. 267–269.

<sup>67</sup> Gregor Benton, "Bolshevizing China: From Lenin to Stalin to Mao, 1921–1944," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol. 12 (1996), no. 1, pp. 38–62, here p. 48. Also cf. Chevrier and Roux, "Braun, Otto," p. 83. A comparison with the Soviet military advisors to the Guomindang in the 1920s, on the other hand, might be interesting.

<sup>68</sup> Kuo Heng-yü and M. L. Titarenko (ed.), *RKP(B), Komintern und die national-revolutionäre Bewegung in China. Dokumente [RKP(B), Comintern and the national-revolutionary movement in China. Documents]*, vol. 1: 1920–1925 (Paderborn: 1996), p. 297.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Litten, "Noulens Affair," p. 507; Frederick S. Litten, "Consider your verdict: Otto Braun in China," *CCP Research Newsletter*, no. 10–11 (1992), pp. 30–36, here pp. 31–32.

<sup>70</sup> Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 10–11. That Bo Gu and Luo Fu (alias Zhang Wentian) invited Braun is also stated by Xie Yibiao, "Guanyu Li De ... tantao," pp. 82–84, though his reasoning includes too large a measure of political phrases ("Leftist deviation," etc.) and thus muddles the central questions: why they should ask for a military advisor if one was anyway meant to go to Ruijin; and why they should ask for Braun, not Stern, whom at least Zhang Guotao held to be much more competent. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party—1928–1939*, (Lawrence/KS: 1972), p. 172.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion," pp. 67–68; Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, pp. 73–74, 78–80, 88–90 (Zunyi Conference).

<sup>72</sup> Otto Braun, "Kak Mao shel k vlasti" [How Mao reached power], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1973, no. 4, pp. 129–151, here p. 140. Also cf. Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 51.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, pp. 47–50; Litten, "Consider your verdict," pp. 32–34; Tarsitano, "The Collapse of the Kiangsi Soviet," ch. 5.

<sup>74</sup> Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, pp. 63–64.

<sup>75</sup> They have been republished in Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, pp. 93–145, 154–178.

<sup>76</sup> The following is based mainly on Litten, *Otto Brauns frühes Wirken*, pp. 52–55 (Guangchang) and pp. 64–66 ("Troika"). How much Braun was involved in the events connected with the Fujian Rebellion is obscure. Cf. Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion," pp. 67–68.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Zeng Jingzhong, "Guanyu Zhongyang Hongjun zhanlue zhuanyi zhi zhunbei" [On the preparations for the Central Red Army's strategic transfer], *Jindaishi yanjiu*, 1986, no. 5, pp. 186–206.

<sup>78</sup> On the preparations also see my forthcoming essay.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. again my forthcoming essay on the Long March.

<sup>80</sup> Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, p. 327. Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, p. 166, claims Braun became director of the committee. The second part of Braun's stay in China remains to be researched in detail.

<sup>81</sup> Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, p. 327–328.

<sup>82</sup> The letter can be found in Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, pp. 146–153. Since I do not know enough about the circumstances of the Eastern Expedition (and do not trust Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, pp. 187–189, because of his implicit slant in favor of Mao) I cannot place Braun's arguments in context and judge their possible merit. However, it should be noted that he argues for securing the current "base area" and for guerrilla warfare on a wide scale, while expressing his fear that what he thought was Mao's analysis of the situation concerning a Soviet-Japanese war breaking out in 1936 might be wrong.

<sup>83</sup> Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, pp. 328–330.

<sup>84</sup> Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 340. It is not explicitly mentioned in Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, p. 330.

<sup>85</sup> Salisbury, *The Long March*, pp. 41, 47, 81–82. See also Wang Qi, "Zunyi huiyi shi dangde lishishang yige shengsi youguande zhuanzhedian" [The Zunyi Conference is a vital turning-point in party history], *Qiushi zazhi*, 1991, no. 16, pp. 40–43, here p. 41 (Braun being "cocksure" and "dictatorial").

Braun, like some other secret agents, acquired a reputation for "womanizing." In fact, he was married or quasi-married at least six times, though, so far as I know (which is, not very far), he seems to have kept to the maxim "one at a time." Anyway, this is about as important as the puzzle of whether Braun, who had the only phonograph in Yan'an, kept only one record ("Parlez moi d'amour," what else!) or a collection. Cf. Anna Wang, *Ich kämpfte für Mao [I fought for Mao]* (Hamburg: 1964), p. 119; Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales), *Inside Red China* (New York: 1939), p. 70; Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 348.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. the preceding note, and additionally, Evan Carlson, *Twin Stars of China* (Westport/CT: 1940), pp. 171–172; Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 412–413; Helen Foster Snow, *My Yenan Notebooks* (Madison/CT: 1961), p. 100; Helen Foster Snow, *My China Years* (New York: 1984), pp. 262–263. For some reason, Helen Foster Snow's esteem of Braun seems to have declined with the years, her view of him as "brilliant" in her *Yenan Notebooks* finding no parallel in *My China Years*.

<sup>87</sup> Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 340; Shi and Zhou, *Li De*, p. 329.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. the above-noted literature.

<sup>89</sup> Peters, "Einige Anmerkungen zu Otto Braun," p. 175.

<sup>90</sup> Lu Hong, "Guanyu Li De zai Hua ... kaobian," p. 241.

<sup>91</sup> Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 363–364.

<sup>92</sup> Not, it seems, for the Soviet Red Army; see *Wer war Wer in der DDR*, p. 95.

<sup>93</sup> Eyewitness reports include: Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, *Tagebuch der Versuchung [Diary of temptation]* (Berlin: 1950), pp. 30–35, 109; Assi Hahn, *Ich spreche die Wahrheit! [I am telling the truth!]* (Eßlingen: 1951), pp. 72–74, 153; Kurt Langmaack, *Stacheldraht statt Sozialismus [Barbed wire instead of socialism]* (Hamburg: 1952), pp. 22–26, 53; Otto Rühle, *Genesung in Jelabuga [Recovery in Yelabuga]* (East Berlin: 1968), pp. 327–329; Bernt von Kügelgen, *Die Nacht der Entscheidung [The night of the decision]* (East Berlin: 1983), pp. 327–328, 330–332, 353–354; Gerhard Dengler, *Zwei Leben in einem [Two lives in one]* (East Berlin: 1989), p. 102; Ernst Kehler, *Einblicke und Einsichten [Insights and understandings]* (East Berlin: 1989), pp. 107–108, 110; Heinz Hoffmann, *Moskau Berlin [Moscow Berlin]* (East Berlin: 1989), pp. 67–68. Further comments on Braun

published in West Germany are cited in Karl-Heinz Frieser, *Krieg hinter Stacheldraht* [War behind barbed wire] (Mainz: 1981), pp. 57–58.

<sup>94</sup> Gert Robel, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion—Antifa* [The German prisoners-of-war in the Soviet Union—Antifa] (München: 1974), pp. 33, 49–52. Also cf. Bodo Scheurig, *Freies Deutschland* [Free Germany] (Köln: 1984), p. 38.

<sup>95</sup> Willy Wolff, “Die erste Konferenz antifaschistischer deutscher Offiziere in der Sowjetunion” [The first conference of anti-fascist German officers in the Soviet Union], *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 13, 1965, pp. 277–282. Also cf. Kehler, *Einblicke und Einsichten*, p. 110.

<sup>96</sup> Von Einsiedel, *Tagebuch der Versuchung*, p. 51.

<sup>97</sup> Wasilij N. Ashajew, *Fern von Moskau* (Moskau: 1950). For an incomplete list of titles translated by Braun see: *Schriftsteller der DDR* [Writers in the GDR] (Leipzig: 1974), pp. 73–74. Mader, “Otto Braun,” p. 29, also refers to various publications by Braun, many of them magazine and newspaper articles.

<sup>98</sup> Information by Bernd-Rainer Barth.

<sup>99</sup> Kurt Fischer, *Die Berliner Abwehrkämpfe 1918/19* [The defensive battles in Berlin 1918/19]. Edited and introduced by Otto Braun (Berlin: 1956); I. K. Kobljakow, *Von Brest bis Rapallo: Geschichtlicher Abriß der sowjetisch-deutschen Beziehungen von 1918 bis 1922* [From Brest to Rapallo: Historical sketch of the Soviet-German relations from 1918 to 1922]. Editor: Otto Braun. Translators: Otto Braun, Hermann Stürmer (Berlin: 1956); Otto Braun, “Lenin und die Militärwissenschaft” [Lenin and military science], *Neues Deutschland*, 20 January 1957, p. 4; Michail A. Scholochow: *Ein Menschenschicksal und andere Erzählungen* [One man's destiny and other tales]. Translated by Otto Braun (Berlin: 1959); Otto Braun: “Die Klassiker des Marxismus zu Fragen der Übersetzung” [The Marxist classics on problems of translation], *Beiträge zur Gegenwartsliteratur*, vol. 15, 1959, pp. 5–30.

<sup>100</sup> *Schriftsteller der DDR*, p. 73.

<sup>101</sup> Konrad Franke, *Die Literatur der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* [The literature of the German Democratic Republic] (München: 1971), pp. 114–116. For information on the people mentioned here, see *Wer war Wer in der DDR*.

<sup>102</sup> Konstantin Michajlovitsch Simonov, *Waffengefährten*, (Düsseldorf: 1966); J. Korolkow, *Der Mann, für den es keine Geheimnisse gab. Richard Sorge in Tokio*

[The man for whom there were no secrets. Richard Sorge in Tokyo] (East Berlin: 1968).

<sup>103</sup> Thomas Kampen, “Otto Braun auf dem langen Marsch” [Otto Braun on the Long March], *das neue China*, 20, 1993, Heft 1, pp. 42–44, here p. 43.

<sup>104</sup> Otto Braun, “Von Schanghai bis Jänan,” *horizont*, 1969, nos. 23–38, always on p. 32. As he explains in the endnote to his *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen*, p. 365, he wrote the serialized memoirs practically without recourse to other sources.

<sup>105</sup> Kuo and Titarenko, *RKP(B), Comintern*, p. 32, note that in the 1950s the Soviets gave to Beijing many documents concerning the CCP and its delegations to the Comintern, without keeping any copies in the U.S.S.R.

<sup>106</sup> The English translation seems to have been the last one and the only one to have changed the title: *A Comintern Agent in China, 1932–1939*. Translated by Jeanne Moore, with an introduction by Dick Wilson (Stanford/CA: 1982).

<sup>107</sup> *Zhongguo jishi 1932–1939* (Beijing: 1980).

<sup>108</sup> Information by his widow. The statement in Litten, “Otto Braun in Deutschland,” p. 182, that Braun died in Berlin, is therefore wrong.

<sup>109</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, 16 August 1974, p. 2; *Neues Deutschland*, 23 August 1974, p. 2 (report on the funeral); *Der Spiegel*, 26 August 1974, p. 108; *The New York Times*, 23 August 1974, p. 23; *Pravda*, 17 August 1974, p. 5.